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Abstract: In February 2007, the CRTC released a set of decisions that constitute
part of an emerging policy framework for a national all hazards, all media pub-
lic alerting system in Canada. This most recent development can be seen as part
of a wider effort on the part of the federal government and others to establish a
next-generation emergency broadcasting system under the CANALERT initia-
tive. For its part, the CRTC has had to negotiate the imperatives of competition
policy as well as those of its role as guardian of the public good. Despite mak-
ing some progress, the recent regulatory decisions represent a narrow interven-
tion strategy that will not resolve many of the uncertainties that have delayed
progress in this area. Further policy research is needed to contribute to a more
extensive policy framework for public alerting in Canada.
Résumé: En février 2007, le CRTC a émis toute une série de décisions faisant
partie d’un cadre réglementaire émergent pour un système national d’alerte
publique au Canada intitulé all hazards, all media. Ces récents développements
peuvent être conçus comme faisant partie d’un effort plus vaste de la part du
gouvernement fédéral et d’autres parties impliquées visant à établir une nouvelle
génération de système de radiotélédiffusion d’urgence sous l’initiative
CANALERT. De son côté, le CRTC a dû négocier les impératifs d’une régle-
mentation compétitive en plus de ceux associés à son rôle de guardien du Bien
public.  Les décisions réglementaires récentes, bien qu’elles offrent des progrès,
représentent une stratégie d’intervention limitée qui n’aura pas pour effet de
résoudre les multiples incertitudes ayant retardé les avancées dans ce domaine.
Davantage de recherches en politiques et réglementations sont nécessaires afin
de contribuer à la création d’un cadre de réglementation plus complet en ce qui
concerne l’alerte publique au Canada.
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The Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 raised global awareness of the
importance of having an effective emergency broadcasting capability. One of the
unforgivable tragedies of that disaster was that information about the threat was
available on the Internet an hour or more before the waves washed ashore in
countries such as Sri Lanka, yet people were still not warned. The quarter-million
lives lost in that event underscore, among other things, an insidious form of dig-
ital divide in the global information infrastructure, which governments are
obliged to address (Samarajiva, 2005).
In Canada, where we might think this is less of an issue, similar concerns
have been raised about this kind of digital divide and the ability to provide timely
warnings to significant parts of the population. For example, a key finding in a
report on British Columbia’s tsunami warning system (Anderson & Gow,
2004)—released several months before the Indian Ocean tsunami—is that despite
the apparent advances made in communications technology, the ability to issue
real-time warnings to members of the public along the BC West Coast, including
tourists and Aboriginal communities, is in many cases uncertain and may be seri-
ously constrained by current regulatory and institutional arrangements.
In early 2007, however, an important step was taken toward addressing some
of these regulatory constraints as part of a larger effort to renew Canada’s emer-
gency broadcasting system. In February, the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) issued a set of important decisions
regarding public alerting in Canada that remove a number of barriers that have
impeded the development of next-generation public alerting technologies. The
practical significance of these decisions will ultimately depend on the voluntary
actions of numerous stakeholders in the coming years, but the importance of the
decisions from a communications-policy standpoint is that together they consti-
tute part of an emerging framework for a national “all hazards, all media” public
alerting system in this country. 
No such framework has ever existed in Canada, and in making its decisions
the CRTC has had to negotiate the imperatives of competition policy as well as
those of its role as guardian of the public good. On the one hand, a national pub-
lic alerting policy cannot be seen to favour one or more industry players in a con-
verging communications sector; on the other hand, the Commission clearly
recognizes that such a system is in the public interest and must decide to what
extent regulatory intervention is necessary to advance its development. However,
the recent CRTC decisions represent a narrow intervention strategy that will not
resolve many of the uncertainties that have delayed progress in establishing a
next-generation national public alerting capability in Canada.
This paper reports on a continuing study that forms part of a larger research
program on communications technology and public safety at the University of
Alberta. In the coming years, that program will be leading various projects to
examine the impact of new information and communications technologies on
public-safety services, including emergency broadcasting and alerting. This paper
reports on recent developments in public alerting and draws from primary source
documents associated with two recent CRTC Public Notices and Decisions on
“emergency alert services” as well as a range of Industry Canada documents on
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public alerting. Additional background information and perspective is derived
from the author’s first-hand experience as member of two Industry Canada work-
ing groups on public alerting as well as his field work on community-based haz-
ard warning in Sri Lanka.
First-generation emergency broadcasting
From the mid-1950s until the early 1990s, the CBC, in conjunction with the fed-
eral government’s Department of Communications, had responsibility for ensur-
ing that an emergency broadcasting system was in place to warn the Canadian
population in case of a national emergency. This arrangement was designed to
complement the National Attack Warning Siren (NAWS) system, which provided
an infrastructure of some 1700 air-raid sirens installed in urban centres across
Canada (Canada, 1993). 
NAWS was developed in the 1950s with the explicit role of notifying the
population of an impending nuclear attack. The system remained officially oper-
ational until the early 1990s, when concerns over the nuclear threat abated with
the ending of the Cold War. At that time it was estimated that 1300 sirens
remained operational, of which only 30% could likely have been activated in time
to meet the prescribed five-minute alert window. The system had essentially
fallen into a state of disrepair (see Figure 1). Moreover, by this time NAWS was
regarded as a technically outdated system of limited value because it was dedi-
cated solely to providing nationwide warnings concerned with a single cata-
strophic event (a nuclear attack). NAWS’ capability was also restricted to
generating a siren blast, so it also only really fulfilled what might be termed the
“alert” function of a warning system, rather than the more extended “notification”
function that would provide additional information about the activation.
Figure 1: Public alerting past. This is a photo taken from eBay, where someone was selling 
old air-raid sirens of the type once used in Canada’s National Attack Warning System.
Source: http://www.civildefensemuseum.com/sirens/canada/ (uncredited).
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The CBC’s supporting role in NAWS was to provide the “notification” function
through its national broadcast network. It was expected that sirens would alert the
public, who would then turn to the public broadcaster for government-issued
information concerning activation of the NAWS and, presumably, for any addi-
tional government instructions and updates following a nuclear attack. At present,
however, we know very few details of this historical relationship between the
public broadcaster, the Department of National Defence, and NAWS during the
Cold War. Further work will be needed to examine this history, and it presents an
interesting opportunity for communication scholars to pursue the topic further as
a contribution to Canadian communications history.
When NAWS was being retired, the federal Department of Communications
(DoC) undertook a survey of emergency managers in Canada and prepared a
report to consider options for the next generation of national public alerting sys-
tem. Among other things, the report noted the importance of the commercial
media as a means of extending the reach of such a system across the country: 
In Canada, more than 99 per cent of the population may be reached via
public or privately owned broadcast radio stations . . . . There is no doubt
that commercial broadcasting stations and networks could deliver warn-
ing messages to listeners or viewers, provided that people have their
receivers turned on and tuned to participating broadcast stations or cable
services . . . .
In view of this, established broadcasting networks could be considered
an appropriate means of warning and providing information to the pub-
lic, provided a formal management agreement is developed. (Canada,
1993, p. 18)
The report prefigures the growing role of commercial service providers in
next-generation public alerting, while understating the difficult challenge of
establishing a “formal management agreement” across converging sectors that
involve both old and new media. Interestingly, while the DoC report did mention
cable television as a possible distribution channel for alerts, it did not mention
telecommunications networks as an existing resource for public alerting, high-
lighting the “two solitudes” that once characterized the broadcasting and telecom-
munications policy worlds. It is important to note that this report was released in
1993—a time of a major government re-organization that replaced the DoC with
the Spectrum and Telecommunications Branch of Industry Canada—but there is
little evidence of any further progress toward a next-generation national public
alerting system in Canada until several years later, in the autumn of 2002, when
Industry Canada launched its “new public alerting initiative” and issued a call for
“unique proposals for the demonstration and evaluation of new public alerting
technologies or products” (Industry Canada, 2005).
Yet local and regional efforts in public alerting were not in stasis during this
intervening period. Across the country, a number of provinces and municipalities
were in fact introducing their own systems. For example, the Edmonton tornado
of 1987 had prompted the Province of Alberta to introduce its Emergency Public
Warning System using the once government-owned CKUA broadcast network.
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Today that system remains operational and is tested regularly; it is even activated
from time to time. The challenge for Emergency Management Alberta, the
provincial department in charge of public alerting, is that the system relies on the
voluntary participation of CKUA (no longer government owned) and other broad-
casters in Alberta to reach the public (Alberta Government, 2006).
At the municipal level, a number of communities, including Strathcona
County, Alberta, and Sarnia, Ontario, have introduced a telephone-based
Community Notification System (CNS) to provide public alerting on a local
scale. CNS is sometimes referred to as “reverse 9-1-1” and is essentially a com-
puterized system that will initiate a mass call-out to all of the telephone numbers
located in a prescribed geographic area. CNS systems are often established by
local authorities in areas prone to industrial accidents such as chemical releases,
but they can also be used for a variety of notification purposes, including Amber
Alert, crime watch, or other forms of urgent public information.
An area of concern with respect to CNS-system administration is the need to
maintain an up to date and complete database of telephone numbers. This has
become particularly difficult with the advent of local-number portability and with
the growing quantity of mobile and IP-based telephone subscribers, both of which
have presented serious problems related to public safety—and 9-1-1 service in
particular (see, for example, Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission, 2005; Gow, 2005). Another concern for both the telephone compa-
nies and public officials is the issue of network congestion during an emergency.
A CNS system, if not well designed, could quickly overwhelm a local telephone
network when mass numbers of calls are initiated, thereby interfering with incom-
ing 9-1-1 calls or other urgent communications.
In addition to these systems, Environment Canada has operated since 1977
its national Weatheradio network. This service is based on the United States
National Weather Service Weather Radio network, using similar frequencies,
technologies, and protocols. The Weatheradio network consists of 180 transmit-
ters located across Canada and provides 24/7 weather information, targeted for
local areas, in both official languages (Meteorological Service of Canada, 2005).
However, it operates in the VHF band and requires a special radio receiver to lis-
ten to the broadcast. Specialized weather radios are available commercially, and
it is increasingly common to see the VHF channels included as a standard feature
on the popular range of Family Radio Service walkie-talkies now on the market.
Nonetheless, it is not clear how many Canadians actually tune in to the broad-
casts, let alone how many are aware that Weatheradio also functions as an “all-
hazards” public alerting service.
Next-generation emergency broadcasting
With the demise of NAWS in the late 1980s, Canada was left with a minimal
national warning capability. On the one hand, the case for such a capability has
weakened with the upheaval in global geopolitics that followed the end of the
Cold War. On the other hand, that upheaval and the events of September 11, 2001,
have also led to changes in the perceived security threat to Canadians. Concerns
over terrorism have largely displaced the nuclear-annihilation scenario, and there
have been indications from government officials during the past few years that
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public alerting is once again a priority within Canada’s emergency-management
framework (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 2007). 
Further evidence of this renewed interest in public alerting takes the form of
a national initiative under Industry Canada known as “CANALERT.” Under the
existing Federal Policy for Emergencies, Industry Canada is responsible for
working with the CBC and private service providers to co-ordinate a national
emergency broadcasting capability. The CANALERT initiative is an effort to
advance the prospects of next-generation public alerting in Canada. Launched in
2002 with the first of several forums on public alerting, it has continued with sev-
eral working groups involving broadcasters, telecommunications providers, and
emergency-management officials:
Canada needs to develop its ability to alert its citizens and share critical
information. Most industrialized countries already have a nation-wide
public alerting system. That is why Industry Canada is working closely
with experts from provincial, territorial and municipal agencies, and the
broadcasting and telecommunications industry, to develop
CANALERT—a Canada-wide public alerting system.
CANALERT will allow emergency management agencies to deliver
brief public alerts over radio, TV, cell phones and the Internet. Alerts will
include instructions and advice on where to find any new information
that becomes available. CANALERT is a key part of our national emer-
gency management system. (Industry Canada, 2006)
Despite important progress on several operational fronts, CANALERT remains
without substantial funding from the federal government and therefore might be
best described—at least for the time being—as a normative design concept for
next-generation emergency broadcasting. In this capacity, it serves up a vision of
an “all-hazards, all-media” public alerting system of national scope—a vision
conceived in heady dreams of technological convergence, but one that is awak-
ening slowly to the hard realities and unrelenting forces of constitutional politics
and contemporary communications policy.
The CANALERT vision is that of an interoperable “system of systems”
extending seamlessly across the reach of emergency officials through every avail-
able communications medium. The technologies involved include not only the
traditional domains of terrestrial broadcast radio and TV, but now also, as indi-
cated above, digital media, including mobile phones, Internet, and satellite broad-
casters, which offer tantalizing prospects. The deeper impulses and contradictions
at work in this field might be linked to the wider socio-historical trends charac-
terized by Beniger’s “control revolution” (Beniger, 1989) or the “simultaneous
dispersion and concentration of advanced services” in Castell’s space of flows
(Castells, 2000, p. 379).
The hard reality is that of federal–provincial relations, where jurisdiction
over emergencies is almost always local, and where funding for building and
maintaining alerting systems is almost always inadequate. From a communica-
tions-policy standpoint, the challenge is to maintain regulatory parity across the
diverse range of commercial service providers needed to achieve the stated aims
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for convergence. Indeed, the CANALERT vision touches upon many of the wider
issues related to the public good, social regulation, and competition policy now
playing out in the cross-cutting domains of broadcasting, telecommunications,
and Internet.
Marc Raboy, for instance, observes that in today’s environment of converg-
ing media, it is not scarcity that is at issue, but rather the need to regulate under
conditions of profound information abundance. As such, he notes that a different
paradigm must be adopted “based on a new set of premises, around how to organ-
ize and make meaningful the mass of information that technology has made avail-
able, for the people who want to use it” (Raboy, 2006, p. 298). Public alerting
faces similar challenges, as information can now arrive by multiple channels
linked to servers around the world. And yet, despite the apparent surfeit of sup-
ply, we need only reflect on the unbelievable communications failure in the
Indian Ocean basin in December 2004 to see there is a clear need for effective
regulatory oversight.
To complicate matters further, there has been no coherent communications-
policy framework under which CANALERT could be expected to operate. As a
result, it has been unclear how a next-generation national system might be cre-
ated and governed, and in what manner it would involve the commitment of com-
mercial communications service providers in each of the primary sectors. Public
alerting is a classic “public good” in the sense that the contents of a warning mes-
sage tend to be non-excludable and non-rival (Melody, 2005). As such, a reliable
“supply” of alerting services to the public tends to require some form of direct
intervention on the part of the government. The very fact that Canada has yet to
establish a clear framework for such intervention creates a serious gap in public-
safety policy.
However, in February 2007 some initial, albeit modest, steps toward such a
framework were taken when the CRTC issued a set of three Broadcasting
Decisions, two Broadcasting Public Notices, and one Telecom Decision—all con-
cerned with the next generation of public alerting capabilities in Canada
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2007c). The
aim of this paper is to provide an overview of these decisions, to highlight their
significance for future developments, to generate discussion, and to draw atten-
tion to the importance of public safety as a core policy issue within the media and
communications sector.
The broadcasting decisions
The Broadcasting Decisions stem from a Public Notice issued in April 2005,
when Pelmorex Communications Inc. (parent company of The Weather
Network/Météomédia), the CBC, and Bell ExpressVu each presented applica-
tions to establish national emergency alert service capabilities. This was in fact
Pelmorex’s second application, the first having been denied by the CRTC in
2001.
The applicants each proposed their own concept for an all-channel alert serv-
ice. The CBC proposed a publicly funded initiative that would incorporate an
existing protocol and technology to relay public alerts from its National Alarm
Centre in Ottawa to its network of transmitter sites by satellite uplink. According
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to this approach, based on the Emergency Alert System (EAS) developed in the
United States, the CBC would install EAS decoder devices at each transmitter
site. Messages would be sent to all transmitters but would be filtered at the local
site to broadcast only those designated for the geographic area served by the
transmitter. In addition, the CBC would permit cable television and direct-to-
home (DTH) satellite providers to link voluntarily with their system by installing
decoders at their head-ends. Furthermore, the CBC indicated that it would pro-
vide alerts in both official languages when available and could extend its capabil-
ity to include Inuktitut if funding were made available to do so. It proposed a
five-year implementation period for the system.
Bell ExpressVu presented a concept for an all-channel alert service based on
its DTH satellite service. In its application, ExpressVu stated that it would enable
its DTH service to relay alerts from authorized sources by “force tuning” sub-
scribers’ television sets, using the existing set-top-box technology, to display an
alphanumeric crawl with an audio message of the warning. While the application
indicated that no fee would be imposed on ExpressVu subscribers to fund this
service, Bell also indicated that the service would be limited to its own subscriber
base, estimated at approximately 1.7 million Canadians. ExpressVu did state that
it would also consider extending the service capability to its mobile phone,
Internet, and telephone affiliates but did not provide an implementation time-
frame for any portion of the system.
The application submitted by Pelmorex was the most ambitious of the three,
in the sense that it asked the Commission to approve a mandatory system that
would include all of the major cable TV and DTH satellite operators and impose
a fee on them for its implementation. Moreover, the concept included the instal-
lation of proprietary equipment at the network head-ends of the participating
operators:
Once an authorized agency provided Pelmorex with the text of an emer-
gency message and identified the affected area, Pelmorex would validate
the authenticity of the message and send a valid, location-encoded alert
to be decoded by its ACA propriety equipment located at all BDUs
within the affected area. The ACA equipment would automatically select
and insert the message, in its original form, on all television channels dis-
tributed to subscribers in the affected area. (Canadian Radio-television
and Telecommunications Commission, 2007a, para. 11) 
In order to effect this service, Pelmorex requested that the Commission issue a
distribution order pursuant to section 9(1)(h) of the Broadcasting Act that would
compel all Class 1 broadcasting distribution undertakings (BDUs) to distribute
the all-channel alert (ACA) service when made available to them. In the case of
smaller BDUs, it would remain an optional service. Pelmorex also requested an
amendment to its licence to raise its maximum wholesale rate to the BDUs by
34% to cover the cost of the service wherever provided.1 If all items were
approved by the Commission, Pelmorex estimated that the system would reach
approximately 9 million Canadian homes within the first three years of operation.
While each approach to all-channel alerting was unique in certain respects,
all three applications identified the same need for an amendment to the
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Broadcasting Distribution Regulations regarding the insertion of emergency alert
messages into the broadcasting stream. In effect, the currently proposed amend-
ment would relax the requirements for cable TV or DTH satellite operators to
obtain prior agreement from broadcasters to disrupt programming for a public
warning. The potential concerns regarding this proposed amendment are dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Another common factor among the applications was the apparent assumption
of a reliable supply of warning messages from authorized government agencies. In
each application, the proposed alert service was predicated not only on the idea
that warnings would be made available, but that they could be simply relayed to
subscribers, with minimal need for the applicants to touch the contents of those
messages. For instance, much discussion during the May 2006 CRTC Public
Hearing on All Channel Alert referred uncritically to Industry Canada’s
CANALERT initiative as a reliable source of public warning messages. This is a
problem because, as noted above, there is no such thing as CANALERT. Or, to be
more precise, CANALERT is a design concept, without a budget, and without an
operational presence of any kind so far. So while it was convenient for ExpressVu
and CBC to indicate that they would obtain warnings from CANALERT and then
relay these on to the public, the reality is that there is no national point-source for
public warnings in Canada. It is surprising that this fundamental gap in capability
remained largely unchallenged in the CRTC proceedings.
Another point of discussion, and one that received considerably more atten-
tion than the problematic supply of warnings, was whether an alert system should
be established on a voluntary or a mandatory basis. The CBC and ExpressVu
applications called for a voluntary system, while Pelmorex presented a manda-
tory system based on proprietary equipment. Just as one might expect, the vari-
ous stakeholders took sides in this debate that matched their role in the proposed
systems. The BDU operators and broadcasters were opposed to a mandatory alert
system, claiming that “as good corporate citizens” they would need no further
incentive to implement an emergency alert system on a voluntary basis. By con-
trast, alert service providers such as Environment Canada called for a mandatory
system, as did emergency-management organizations such as the Ontario
Association of Emergency Managers, which argued that “the voluntary nature of
the present system of media-based public alerting has regularly proven to be
unreliable given that it is left to the whim of media owners” (Canadian Radio-tel-
evision and Telecommunications Commission, 2007a, para. 48).
Opposition to a mandatory all-channel alert system raised some interesting
points in the deliberations. One interesting question raised by the BDU operators
concerned the nature of the proposed emergency alert messages and whether they
in fact would constitute a “programming undertaking” and would require the
originators to hold some form of broadcasting licence. Broadcasters were
opposed to any mandatory system that would threaten their control over broad-
casting signals, citing journalistic integrity and independence as key principles
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2007a).
Others noted problems with Pelmorex’s application with regard to the digital
migration policy framework in Canada and the issue of stranded investments in
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analogue equipment that cable TV providers and others might be required to
install under a mandatory regime. Yet others were opposed to any mandatory sys-
tem, such as that proposed by Pelmorex, that would be based on proprietary tech-
nology imposed on BDU operators and financed through a for-profit or fee-based
model.
For its part, the Commission weighed the evidence and decided that public
alerting will remain a voluntary undertaking for the time being. A number of
points were raised to support its determinations in this regard. First, that the pub-
lic is best served by a system that promotes an “all-media” approach to public
alerting. The CRTC quoted the CBC directly on this point: “Universal access by
the public to alert messages can only be realized through [a] multiplatform
approach” (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission,
2007a, para. 74). As a core principle in this policy framework, then, it is perhaps
no surprise to see that the Commission found the Pelmorex proposal for a manda-
tory, proprietary, and BDU-based system funded by a monthly fee to be “unduly
intrusive” (para. 78). Moreover, the regulator expressed its concern about the
impact of a mandatory system on innovation in this area and, in particular, on
research and development activities that might support a multiplatform approach
using alternative technologies for public alerting.
While it was not willing to support a mandatory service, the Commission did
note an inherent public interest in enabling timely access to emergency alerts. In
response it has issued Broadcasting Public Notice 2007-21, a call for comments
on proposed amendments to the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations. At first
glance the proposed amendments appear to be small changes, but they could in
fact raise significant concerns for the broadcasting industry and other stakehold-
ers. The first, as I have already noted, is a proposed amendment to section 7(d) of
the regulations that would mean that cable TV or DTH satellite service providers,
for example, “would no longer have to obtain the prior agreement of the operator
of a programming service, or network responsible for the service, before insert-
ing an emergency alert message.” (CRTC 2007b, para. 2) Current regulations
require that BDU operators obtain prior agreements with each of the program-
ming services they carry if they wish to “force tune” any or all of their channels
to display an emergency alert message. 
As the Commission has noted, broadcasters are concerned with this proposed
amendment because it raises the spectre of a national emergency warning system
that “could be put to an ever-expanding menu of potential uses” (CRTC, 2007b
para. 83), meaning in effect that the licensees might effectively lose control of
their programming content. In response to this concern, the CRTC has offered
something of a concession to the broadcasters, in the form of a narrowing of the
definition of “emergency alert message” in the regulations.
The current definition of “emergency alert” refers to a message with content
that conveys information about an “imminent or unfolding danger to life or prop-
erty.” The proposed amendment simply removes the reference to property. In the
Commission’s view this measure
will serve to attenuate the concerns expressed by broadcasters and also
bring the definition more in line with CANALERT’s proposed definition,
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which encapsulates only the most urgent emergencies and limits the airing
of alerts to situations that represent an imminent danger to life and health.
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2007a,
para. 87)
It should be noted also that the definition does not distinguish between an alert
message consisting of primarily alphanumeric text (e.g., a screen crawl) and a
more conventional broadcast involving what might be considered programming
service. The implications of such a distinction, as noted by a number of interested
parties in the CRTC hearing, could be significant in terms of the CRTC’s juris-
diction over this matter.
The CRTC has invited comments on the proposed amendments with
Broadcasting Public Notice 2007-21. While broadcasters will likely appreciate
the effort to constrain the definition of “emergency alert message,” this may not
be enough of a measure to offset their reluctance to lose control of their program-
ming. For example, the proposed amendment fails to specify by whom or by what
means a BDU operator or emergency-management organization will determine
when a situation meets the conditions of the definition. The Commission might
have chosen to adopt the definition proposed in the CBC application, using the
phrase “authorized emergency alert message” (CRTC 2007a, para. 20), but even
with this wording, the question would have remained: authorized by whom? At
present, there is considerable uncertainty among all stakeholders as to who would
be authorized to activate a national alerting system and what kinds of accounta-
bility measures would need to be put in place to assure broadcasters and others of
the integrity of such arrangements.
The proposed measure also says nothing about placing limits on the number
of messages that might interrupt programming during an emergency (e.g., critical
updates and cancellations), which could cut into and possibly contradict live on-
air reports from local broadcasters. Moreover, the current framework sets the
stage for a kind of “two-tier” public alerting system, in the sense that only a very
narrow range of emergency situations will likely qualify for all-channel alert acti-
vation. The priority level for most cases of local severe-weather events or even
hazardous-material spills might be such that emergency managers would hesitate
to activate an all-channel system and instead simply notify local broadcasters
through existing channels. Not only could this lead to public confusion about
where to turn for warning information, but it would limit BDU operators to such
a narrow mandate that it might discourage them from participating in the system
altogether.2
For example, it is understandable that a BDU operator might decline partici-
pation in a voluntary national public alerting system after having weighed the
costs of network upgrades and the potential legal liability against the extremely
limited conditions under which the system might be put to use—despite the
potential public benefit. In fact, it is entirely conceivable that under the proposed
definition of “emergency alert message” the system would be underutilized or
would perhaps never be activated in certain parts of Canada, in part because of
hesitation or reluctance by the local emergency manager or the BDU operator to
commit to such a serious action.
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The end result of the Public Notice and CRTC decisions is that they repre-
sent a modest advance in the development of next-generation national public
alerting in Canada. The Commission has approved in part the Pelmorex applica-
tion by agreeing to amend its condition of licence to permit it to carry emergency
messages on the Weather Network and Météomédia. However, under the decision
Pelmorex may offer its ACA service to BDU operators on a voluntary basis only.
In the case of CBC and ExpressVu, the Commission’s proposed amendments to
section 7(d) of the regulations will allow their proposed systems to go forward,
also on a voluntary basis, but the decisions set no definitive timeline or mile-
stones in terms of making the service available to Canadians.
The Commission does make it clear that all stakeholders should continue to
work together to establish some form of national public alerting system. For
instance, the CRTC “strongly expects” that BDU operators will voluntarily carry
alert messages provided to them by either CBC or Pelmorex, or alternatively that
they will adopt their own systems. In addition, the Commission wants to see that
efforts are made to provide alerts in both official languages, as well as other lan-
guages where and when appropriate; furthermore, it expects “to be updated on
such efforts at each license renewal” (CRTCa, para. 103). The Commission also
spoke to concerns about providing alerts to both the deaf and visually impaired
communities related to interference with closed captioning and the provision of
simultaneous audio alerts.
The telecom decision
On the same day as the broadcasting decisions, the CRTC also released Telecom
Decision 2007-13. “Use of information for the purpose of providing an enhanced
community notification service” (CRTC 2007d). The significance of this decision
is that incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) are now permitted to provide
information from their 9-1-1 databases to local authorities in order to improve
local public alerting using community notification services.
In effect this decision provides the Commission’s final response to an appli-
cation pursuant to CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure Part VII filed
jointly in 2005 by various public-safety agencies and municipalities on the mat-
ter of community notification services. In light of the difficulty in maintaining up
to date lists of local telephone subscribers, the local authorities were seeking
access to a source of information that would be more accurate and current than
traditional methods (e.g., telephone directory listings). As it happens, the ILECs
maintain special databases to provide 9-1-1 operators with caller-ID and location
information during emergency calls. These databases are updated frequently and
have special filters that detect errors in the address field, which makes them
extremely reliable sources of information on telephone subscribers.
The Part VII application filed by the local authorities—a formal process for
asking the Commission to take specific action on an issue—was necessary because
of regulatory restrictions placed on the ILECs that provide access to 9-1-1 data-
bases. Similarly to the case with the Broadcast Decisions, there were concerns
raised about the overuse of an enhanced CNS system and the subsequent desensi-
tization of subscribers to it, and the Commission declared it inappropriate to
include a reference to property as part of a definition of emergency. However, its
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definition for CNS is slightly more expansive than that proposed for the
Broadcasting Distribution Regulations:
the Commission defines emergency for enhanced CNS as “an imminent
or unfolding danger that threatens the life, health or security of an indi-
vidual.” (CRTC 2007d, para. 72) 
In this case the definition is intended to restrict disclosure of private customer
information, rather than to address a concern with unnecessary disruption to a
broadcasting signal. In fact, the primary issue of concern in the enhanced-CNS
proceeding was personal privacy rights in relation to public safety. Unlike broad-
casting, which reaches a largely unknown and unknowable audience at any given
moment, CNS is an addressable alerting system that requires some knowledge of
the individual recipients in order to deliver the messages. A mass outbound call-
ing system, after all, requires access to a mass database of telephone numbers.
More specifically, the CRTC’s deliberations on this matter focused on the
terms and conditions by which subscriber information held by the ILEC can be
provided to public authorities to facilitate a public alert. Currently there is an
exemption in the Terms of Service that permits some disclosure of confidential
customer information in the event of an emergency. However, the current word-
ing places the onus on the ILEC to make that determination, so the Commission
has proposed revised wording that would make it clear that the public authority
will make the determination as to the threat and the need for such information.
The Commission also referred to “safeguards for enhanced CNS” intended to
balance the three elements of accountability, privacy rights, and public-safety
considerations. In this regard, the Decision established a policy of implied con-
sent with no opt-out provisions for telephone subscribers. In others words, on the
side of public safety, the Commission agreed with various stakeholders that the
public interest is best served by a system that includes all subscribers and that a
regime of prior notification through statement in a telephone company’s Terms of
Service would suffice as a consent mechanism.
On the side of privacy rights, the Commission determined that both ILECs
and public authorities must abide by limits on disclosure of customer informa-
tion. In this regard, there are provisions in place for limiting access to informa-
tion, as well as reporting and auditing requirements when an enhanced CNS
system is activated, as well as a requirement to destroy subscriber information
immediately after activation. With regard to the question of so-called “database
enrichment” that could provide public authorities with additional personal infor-
mation about subscribers—information going beyond telephone number and
street address—the Commission determined that this was beyond the necessary
scope of enhanced CNS and refused to permit its inclusion.
The privacy issues seem to have been addressed to the satisfaction of the
Commission as well as privacy-rights advocates such as the federal privacy com-
missioner. However, work will continue in the enhanced-CNS area. The Decision
directs the CRTC’s Interconnection Steering Committee (CISC) to develop and
report on specific guidelines to address operational and technical issues associ-
ated with this public alerting service. For scholars interested in the more intimate
deliberations on communications policy and the social shaping of information
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and communications technology, the CISC proceedings may prove an interesting
case study, particularly as stakeholders try to make sense of the CNS decision
within the broader aims of CANALERT.
Renewing Canada’s emergency broadcasting system
A renewed emergency broadcasting system of national scope, and in particular
one that can effectively reach into rural and remote communities, is probably a
worthy effort. With today’s digital and networked communications technologies,
as well as the participation of commercial providers in each of the communica-
tions sectors, it is possible to put in place a flexible and cost effective system that
will save lives (see Figure 2)—whether the emergency is a tsunami on the West
or East Coast, a tornado on the Prairies, or a hazardous-material spill in the indus-
trial areas of Ontario and Quebec.
Figure 2: A next-generation alerting system developed by Solana Networks in Ottawa, Canada.
Solana will soon be extending its system to reach mobile devices such as cell phones and PDAs.
Source: http://alert.solananetworks.com.
The recent CRTC decisions are integral to a larger effort on the part of federal,
provincial, and territorial governments in Canada to initiate a next-generation
national emergency broadcasting/public alerting system. For communications
policy research in Canada, this commitment and the various activities surround-
ing it should be seen as part of the wider debate concerning the need to balance
effective social regulation in the media and communications sector within a con-
text of growing information abundance and rapid technological change.
Although the CRTC has established the contours of a more coherent policy
framework in this area, public authorities will continue to struggle to maintain
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and operate local and regional public alerting systems—a struggle complicated
by the lingering political and institutional uncertainties within which these sys-
tems have co-existed. 
Important questions remain to be answered. Will the CRTC’s insistence on a
voluntary public alerting regime be enough to compel the participation of broad-
casters, BDUs, and telephone companies? Is it possible to establish national stan-
dards and guidelines for public alerting given the jurisdictional constraints
associated with the emergency-management policy framework in this country?
Will the work being undertaken by the CRTC’s Interconnection Steering
Committee become bogged down in unresolved technical details related to
enhanced CNS?
Moreover, will third-party application developers—some with innovative
ideas based on cell broadcasting and IP-based alerting technologies—be permit-
ted reasonable access to the incumbents’ network facilities to offer their services
to the public? Or should the Commission take a stronger position on public alert-
ing, seeing it as a clear matter for direct regulation related to universal access
and essential services?
Whatever comes of the decisions in the short term, it is clear that the
Canadian government and policymakers have made a commitment to renew
Canada’s emergency broadcasting system. For policymakers and researchers
alike, this process of renewal should be seen as part of a wider study in commu-
nications technology and public safety. Research at the University of Alberta, for
example, will include policy-related studies in areas such as locative media, pub-
lic safety, and social surveillance; the future of 9-1-1 emergency service; and the
role of open source software development in supporting the communications
needs of emergency-aid agencies during disasters. Central to this research is the
need to understand the evolution of Canada’s communications system in an effort
to promote appropriate intervention strategies that will balance commercial
imperatives with the important public interest in safety and security.
Readers should also note that considerable activity is now taking place in
the realm of public-safety communications both in Canada and internationally.
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission is looking at the
use of mobile phones for public alerting with its Commercial Mobile Service
Alert Advisory Committee (Federal Communications Commission, 2006). The
European Commission is funding a multiyear project on public-safety commu-
nications that will have an impact on international policymaking (European
Commission, 2007), and the International Telecommunications Union is
engaged in a number of initiatives to improve hazard warning and emergency
communications in the developing world (International Telecommunications
Union, 2007). 
Despite these important efforts, much of the work is confined at the moment
to participants from industry and government. There are significant opportunities
for greater involvement from policy researchers and communications scholars to
add a critical voice to the discussion and to expand the range of vision within
which these issues are currently being debated. Emergency broadcasting is one of
several areas in which researchers and scholars can become engaged with policy-
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making and make an important contribution to the public good and quality of life
in Canada and elsewhere.
Notes
1. Pelmorex’s application called for an increase of $0.08 per subscriber, raising the current maxi-
mum charged to BDUs from $0.23 per subscriber to $0.31 per subscriber. A more detailed discus-
sion of reasons for the proposed increase and costing methodology can be found in the transcript
of the CRTC ACA Public Hearing from May 2006 (Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications, 2006).
2. A two-tier system could impose additional costs in terms of public awareness campaigns. Members
of the public would need to know that different kinds of public alerts are available over different
channels and that they should not ignore a message because the warning is not an “all-channel
alert.” A local boil-water advisory, for instance, might not meet the proposed definition in section
7(d), but it is nevertheless life-critical information, and the public would need to be made aware of
the various sources for these kinds of “orange” alerts. This raises the question of whether there
might be value in developing a national portal for alert and notification messages, which could use
RSS feeds, SMS, and other means to deliver customized notifications to subscribers.
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